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Abstract 
 
Space weather can affect both ground-based and space-borne infrastructures, potentially resulting in failures or
service disruptions across the globe and causing damage to equipment and systems. With society having become
increasingly reliant on the services these infrastructures provide, a more thorough analysis of the risk due to
extreme space weather is warranted. Most studies on the impact of space weather on infrastructures focus on the
high-voltage power grid, aviation and communication. A less well-known area of potential vulnerability is the
impact of space weather on the financial services sector. Elements of this sector’s operations depend on accurate
timing, a service which is increasingly provided by space based – and therefore space weather prone -
technologies. The Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), for example, are commonly used for deriving time
stamps for financial transactions. In order to address this topic, the Joint Research Centre of the European
Commission, the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
jointly organised the “Space weather and financial services” workshop in London on 27 June 2014. The half-day
workshop was attended by 50 representatives of the financial service industry, insurance, European and US
government agencies, regulators, academia and the European Commission. The objectives of the workshop were
to discuss the potential impact of extreme space weather on financial services, in particular through the effect on
timing systems of a loss of GNSS services, and to raise the awareness of this risk in the sector. This report presents
the findings of this workshop. 
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 Executive Summary 
 
Space weather can affect both ground- and space-based infrastructures, potentially resulting in 
failures or service disruptions across the globe and causing damage to equipment and systems. 
With society having become increasingly reliant on the services these infrastructures provide, 
a more thorough analysis of the risk due to extreme space weather is warranted. 
 
Most studies on the impact of space weather on infrastructures focus on the high-voltage 
power grid, aviation and communication. A less well-known area of potential vulnerability is 
the impact of space weather on the financial services sector. Elements of this sector’s 
operations depend on accurate timing, a service which is increasingly provided by space-
based – and therefore space-weather-prone – technologies. The Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS), for example, are commonly used for deriving time stamps for financial 
transactions.  
 
In order to address this topic, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, the UK 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat, and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration jointly organised the “Space weather and financial services” workshop in 
London on 27 June 2014. The half-day workshop was attended by 50 representatives of the 
financial service industry, insurance, European and US government agencies, regulators, 
academia and the European Commission. The objectives of the workshop were to discuss the 
potential impact of extreme space weather on financial services, in particular through the 
effect on timing systems of a loss of GNSS services, and to raise awareness of this risk in the 
sector. 
 
The main workshop conclusions are: 
• Space weather has a global footprint and can affect multiple infrastructures at the same 
time.  
• The susceptibility of society to space weather is increasing due to its reliance on services 
provided by vulnerable infrastructures and interdependencies between infrastructures. 
• Interdependencies between critical infrastructures need to be considered in the space-
weather risk assessment. These interdependencies are complex and therefore not yet fully 
understood and routinely assessed. 
• Elements of the financial sector’s operations depend on accurate timing which is often 
provided by vulnerable space-borne infrastructures, such as GNSS. 
• During extreme space weather the severe disruption or loss of GNSS services seems 
certain, although timing services are more resilient than those used for navigation. Other 
timing methods or holdover capability are therefore required, and alternative, fairly 
inexpensive, options exist. 
• The vulnerability of the financial services sector internationally to extreme space weather 
appears to vary, and awareness among operators and regulators globally is currently 
limited.  
• Resilience to space weather across the financial services sector needs to be built. This 
includes the identification of its vulnerabilities and any mitigation (including early-
warning services) it needs to make the sector’s activities more resilient. 
• There are European and US space-weather forecasting capabilities to support early 
warning of governments and vulnerable industries. 
• Multilateral and international collaboration for emergency-response planning is necessary 
to cope with extreme events. 
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1. Introduction 
Solar activity shapes the space environment near the Earth and influences our planet’s 
magnetosphere and upper atmosphere. This so-called space weather can affect both ground-
based and space-borne infrastructures, potentially resulting in failures or service disruptions 
and causing damage to equipment and systems. With society becoming increasingly reliant on 
the services these infrastructures provide, a more thorough analysis of the risk resulting from 
extreme space weather is warranted. 
 
Most studies on the impact of space weather on infrastructures focus on the high-voltage 
power grid - the backbone of modern society, aviation and communication. A potential area 
of concern that has been identified (e.g. RAE, 20131) but is relatively less well known than for 
other sectors is the impact of space weather on the financial services sector. This sector 
depends on accurate timing, a service which is increasingly provided by space-weather-prone 
technologies. The Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), for example, are commonly 
used for deriving time stamps for financial transactions. Precision in timing is therefore 
critical, in particular for high-speed trading. 
 
In order to address this topic, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, 
the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) jointly organised the “Space weather and financial services” 
workshop in London on 27 June 2014. The main aim of the event was to discuss the potential 
impact of extreme space weather on financial services, in particular through the effect on 
timing systems of a loss of GNSS services, and to raise the awareness of this risk in the 
financial sector. In addition, the workshop aimed to encourage the financial services industry 
to assess the space-weather risk to its systems in general, and to consider what mitigation 
measures might be needed. 
 
The half-day workshop was attended by 50 representatives of the financial services industry 
(major European and non-European banks and industry bodies, the London Stock Exchange), 
insurance, European and US government agencies, regulators, academia and the European 
Commission. The main conclusions of the workshop are summarised in the following sections. 
The workshop programme and the list of participating institutions are provided in Annexes 1 
and 2. 
2. Space weather and its impacts 
The first session of the workshop introduced the origin and characteristics of space weather, 
as well as its potential impacts on critical infrastructures. Three speakers from NOAA, the 
JRC, and CCS examined the problem from phenomenological, risk-assessment and 
emergency-planning perspectives. 
 
Past space-weather-induced infrastructure damage and service outages, e.g. in 1989 or 2003, 
showed that the impact of space weather is global, and can affect multiple infrastructures 
simultaneously. The impact ranges from failure of GPS-based positioning or the rerouting of 
flights on polar routes to power outages and the loss of satellites. The potential for global 
impact is exacerbated by the increasing reliance of modern society on critical infrastructures. 
The GNSS, for instance, facilitate a wide range of commercial activities, such as aviation, 
                                                 
1 Royal Academy of Engineering (2013) Extreme space weather: impacts on engineered systems and 
infrastructure, United Kingdom, ISBN 1-903496-95-0. 
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road and marine transport, precision agriculture, banking and the control of power grids. A 
loss of GNSS services would therefore be broadly disruptive.  
 
There are three types of solar activity that can affect critical infrastructures: 1) Solar flares, 
which can trigger radio blackouts and disturb the GNSS network, radar, and ground- and 
space-based communications (including high-frequency communication); 2) solar radiation 
storms, which can affect satellite operations and aviation; and 3) the ejection of large 
quantities of magnetised solar plasma (so-called Coronal Mass Ejections or CMEs), which 
can cause geomagnetic storms on Earth. These storms have potentially significant 
consequences on satellite operations, aviation, power-grid operations, rail networks and 
GNSS. Fast CMEs with speeds of up to 3,000 km/s are of greatest concern and appear to 
occur every few years. Fortunately for human activities, most of them miss the Earth, or carry 
a magnetic field with a polarity that does not induce a geomagnetic storm. The predictability 
of space weather is still limited, and so is the early-warning lead time.  
 
There is increasing awareness of the threat of extreme space weather to infrastructures, which 
has led to the inclusion of worst-case scenarios in the national risk-assessment programmes of 
some countries (e.g. UK, Sweden, The Netherlands, Norway, USA). However, a quantitative 
risk assessment is rendered difficult by the fact that the frequency of extreme space-weather 
events is not precisely known. In the UK and USA, the occurrence probability of an extreme 
space-weather event is evaluated at 6-12 % in the next 10 years. With respect to impact, there 
are infrastructure sectors that have started looking into their vulnerability, e.g. the power grid, 
but interdependencies between infrastructures are not currently fully understood or assessed. 
Better understanding and routine assessment of interdependencies would help to improve 
resilience to possible cascading effects from this risk. This is compounded by the global 
footprint of extreme space weather, which challenges common business-continuity 
assumptions such as the replaceability of services and the continued availability of specialist 
knowledge, skills and equipment. 
 
In response to the space-weather threat, the US government and regulatory bodies have set up 
working groups tasked with establishing standards and creating emergency-response plans to 
address space-weather-related issues more effectively. In the UK, the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat is working with partners in Government, academia and industry to develop a 
national cross-cutting response plan to reflect the wide range of simultaneous impacts on 
critical infrastructures in case of extreme space weather. The reasonable worst-case baseline 
scenario is a Carrington-type solar storm2 that would affect satellites, telecommunication, 
transport, and the power grid. While uncertainties remain, progress is being made to prepare 
for this threat. In this context, multilateral and international collaboration is deemed necessary, 
considering that national response capabilities could be overwhelmed by an extreme solar 
event affecting a large geographical area, and impacting on many different infrastructures.  
 
The key messages from Session 1 are: 
• Space weather has a global footprint and can affect multiple infrastructures at the same 
time. 
• The susceptibility of society to space weather is increasing due to its reliance on services 
provided by vulnerable infrastructures and interdependencies between infrastructures. 
                                                 
2 The Carrington event of 1859 is the largest solar storm recorded. It is believed that a similar solar 
storm occurring nowadays would cause significant and possibly long-lasting disruption to modern 
society (cf. National Research Council (2009) Severe Space Weather Events - Understanding Societal 
and Economic Impacts: A Workshop Report - Extended Summary, Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press). 
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• Awareness of the space-weather threat is increasing and some countries have included it 
in their strategic national risk assessment. 
• Interdependencies between critical infrastructures need to be considered in the space-
weather risk assessment. These interdependencies are complex and therefore not always 
fully understood or routinely assessed. 
• Emergency-response planning for extreme space-weather impact on society should 
consider the full range of potentially affected infrastructures. 
• Multilateral and international collaboration for response planning is necessary to cope 
with extreme events that overwhelm national response capacities. 
3. GNSS issues and what they mean for financial 
systems 
In the second session, two speakers from the University of Bristol and the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority discussed the dependence of financial markets on accurate timing, and the 
UK regulatory requirements for ensuring resilience of the financial sector. 
 
Timing is crucial in the financial sector, considering that exchange matching engines can 
operate at about one million transactions per second, and the same assets trade at multiple 
exchanges. Delayed or inaccurate time stamps affect the order of executed transactions and 
can therefore give a distorted picture of the current value of assets. Consequently, if timing is 
poor, the operator loses the overview of his or her current risk position. In such a situation, the 
prudent course of action would be to stop trading until reliable timing is re-established.  
 
The fragility of the financial market and its dependence on accurate timing is illustrated by 
the Flash Crash on 6 May 2010. A combination of volatile market conditions, a sell algorithm 
gone awry that traded E-Mini S & P 500 contracts, and high-frequency trading triggered the 
crash. A contributing factor was the time delay in quotes from the New York Stock Exchange 
because of an exceptionally high trading volume on that day. Although delayed, these quotes 
were time-stamped as fresh, which created confusion as to the true current prices of stocks. 
As traders withdrew from the markets in the face of uncertainty, thereby removing liquidity, 
some shares plummeted to a price of 1 cent while others skyrocketed to astronomical levels. 
Prices started to recover only when an automatic stabiliser cut in and paused trading of the E-
Mini S & P for five seconds to prevent further price declines. This example shows that there 
is also a risk resulting from poor knowledge of space weather amongst traders who could 
have an incentive to sell unnecessarily if a severe event was forecast and they based their 
actions upon extreme scenarios available on line. 
 
With its inherent dependence on time-stamping, the financial sector is vulnerable to all events 
that result in a loss of accurate timing, including extreme space weather through its impact on 
GNSS. Awareness of this vulnerability varies among financial operators, which has led to 
non-uniform levels of preparedness. Some exchanges have global high-precision networks 
with multiple atomic clocks as a backup; others use a GPS feed but have no fallback option in 
case the satellite signal is lost. 
 
In the UK, regulators require financial market infrastructures to identify sources of 
operational risk and its likelihood, and to mitigate this risk to ensure high levels of resilience 
in case of major disruption. The obligation to identify threats and assess their impact also 
applies to external and unexpected hazards which could in principle include extreme space 
weather. The regulatory approach for risk mitigation is, therefore, generic. If new risk 
priorities are identified, the planning can be topped up. 
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According to UK regulatory requirements, risk reduction should be achieved by implementing 
appropriate systems, policies, procedures and controls that allow the identification, 
monitoring, and management of operational risks. This includes a business continuity plan 
(BCP), procedures for communicating and testing plans, and processes to facilitate 
management of change. These arrangements should enable financial infrastructures to 
function in case of disruption, to limit the losses caused, and to ensure timely recovery. How 
these requirements are implemented depends on an operator’s business model and exposure. 
Major incidents involving financial infrastructures muse be reported to the respective 
regulators as soon as possible. 
 
The key conclusions from Session 2 are: 
• Accurate time stamps are necessary to determine the prices of assets. These time stamps 
are often derived from vulnerable space-borne infrastructures. 
• In case of an event in which timing is lost, true prices cannot be established. This can 
cause or exacerbate market disruptions or crashes. 
• In such a situation, it would be prudent to suspend trading until reliable timing can be re-
established.  
• Awareness of extreme space weather and the associated vulnerability of the financial 
sector appears to be limited across operators and regulators. 
• Preparedness levels of financial operators to loss of GNSS services are not uniform. 
• The UK regulatory framework for financial market infrastructures requires the 
identification of external and unforeseen threats, and an assessment of their potential 
impact. Extreme space weather should be included in the assessment. 
4. Mitigation for loss of GNSS 
In the third session, three speakers from the UK Met Office, the UK National Physical 
Laboratory, and the University of Bath provided an overview of mitigation options available 
in the case that GNSS services used for timing purposes are lost.  
 
The UK Met Office has created its own 24/7 space-weather forecasting capability to support 
the industry and government in the UK. It has engaged in operational collaboration with the 
NOAA Space Weather Prediction Centre and the British Geological Survey and adds UK-
centric advice and impact to daily space-weather forecasts. The Met Office’s current 
capabilities include the provision of space-weather alerts and warnings (radio blackout alerts, 
geomagnetic watches, proton/electron flux warnings), technical guidance and plain-language 
forecasts. These products are currently available to restricted recipients only. They are the 
basis on which the Met Office teams prepare advice and guidance for external stakeholders 
and customers. Enhancements planned for the coming 12 months include the introduction of 
sector-specific web pages (e.g. for power-grid operators), information to the public, and the 
implementation of new models and model improvements (e.g. forecasts of solar energetic 
particle events, improved flare forecasts). 
 
The UK National Physical Laboratory (NPL) is the home of the UK’s timescale UTC (NPL) 
which is the national realisation of Coordinated Universal Time. The timing accuracy 
currently achieved is 2 × 10-16 which translates to an error of 1 second in 158 million years. 
Timing is used for a variety of actions in the financial sector, such as trading, instrumentation, 
forensics, and risk evaluation, as well as for regulatory purposes. In NPL’s experience, 
awareness of the financial sector’s dependence on timing is slowly increasing in the UK. 
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However, there is not much information available on how timing is implemented, and there is 
no common clock. As an alternative to timing via GNSS, the NPL offers a certified 
microsecond timing solution via optic fibre. This reduces the vulnerability to space weather, 
and also to jamming or spoofing. In addition, the NPL time signal is resilient owing to an 
atomic clock redundancy at the hub with a holdover capacity of over a month.  
 
GNSS signals are weak, and are subject to interference from space weather. As a consequence, 
signal delays or fluctuations can result, with more or less significant impact on services using 
the GNSS for timing purposes. It is believed that signal delays caused by space-weather- 
triggered changes in the ionosphere could be mitigated for moderate space weather, such as 
the conditions during the Halloween Storm in October 2003. The use of multi-frequency 
receivers should be capable of largely eliminating the delay error in most cases owing to the 
frequency dependence of the signal delay. It is unclear, however, what would happen under 
conditions of extreme space weather. Signal-strength fluctuations due to ionospheric 
scintillation and the subsequent inability of the receiver to track the signal are more difficult 
to mitigate. In fact, under extreme space-weather conditions, the loss of GNSS services seems 
certain although timing services are more resilient than those for navigation as connection is 
needed with only one satellite rather than several. In this case, alternative, relatively 
inexpensive, timing methods or holdover capability is required. A possible mitigation option 
in case of GNSS-disciplined clocks would be the use of holdover oscillators that are 
disconnected from the satellite when a problem is detected. This requires timely and reliable 
early warning and a definition of the point in time at which the oscillator should disconnect. 
In addition, the oscillator quality significantly impacts the timing error.  
 
The main outcomes from Session 3 are: 
• There are European and US space-weather forecasting capabilities to support early 
warning of governments and vulnerable industries. 
• The financial services sector needs to identify its vulnerabilities and the early-warning 
services it requires to render its activities more resilient. 
• Under extreme space-weather conditions the loss of GNSS services seems certain, and 
alternative timing methods or holdover capability are required. 
• Alternative timing options exist and they are not too costly. 
5. Discussion 
Following the introductory sessions on space weather, its potential impact on infrastructures, 
and consequence mitigation options, this session aimed at capturing first reactions and 
comments by the audience. 
 
Awareness of the financial sector’s vulnerability to space weather appears to be limited. This 
concerns both the direct impact on the sector via its GNSS dependence and the indirect 
impact through space-weather effects in other critical infrastructures the sector relies on (e.g. 
power grid, communication, transport). In case of extreme space weather, the consequences 
might not be easily foreseeable due to the multiplicity of infrastructures and the simultaneous 
impact.  
 
Concern was voiced with respect to regionalisation effects related to space weather, as areas 
in sunlight or around midnight would be affected more. With the financial market operating 
globally, serious repercussions on trading are possible due to timing errors, even if an 
operator’s own country or continent does not experience the space-weather event. These 
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interdependencies need to be understood before evaluating the resilience of the financial 
sector to space-weather-induced critical-infrastructure disruptions. 
 
There was agreement that the space-weather risk can in principle be mapped in the financial 
operators’ Business Continuity Plan provided that sufficient information is available on the 
nature of the potential impact and its probabilities. However, there is a need to know if and 
how standard preparedness planning assumptions are challenged in case of extreme space 
weather. While there is some experience from other types of infrastructures to draw from, the 
current state of knowledge on space-weather impact on the financial sector is insufficient to 
make this determination. Targeted research efforts in collaboration with industry are required 
to shed light on this issue. 
 
Mitigation options for timing errors are available and range from land-based time signals, 
cheaper oscillators up to very sophisticated holdover systems. In addition to significantly 
hardening the financial market to loss of GNSS services, any measure taken to mitigate 
against space weather could help to mitigate also against other risks, e.g. signal jamming of 
spoofing. The implementation of such measures has probably been hampered by a lack of 
awareness of the risk by operators and regulators. 
 
Another issue raised was the availability of early warning tailored to the specific needs of  the 
financial services sector in case of extreme space weather. Currently, no such warning 
mechanism is in place, in contrast to other types of infrastructures. Further study is required to 
define the events and threshold magnitudes that are severe enough to trigger a warning or an 
alarm, as well as the associated potential impacts on the financial market and a response 
framework. In the UK, the Met Office, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and HMT would 
be involved in this task, which should be carried out in close collaboration with the financial 
sector in order to capture the industry’s specific needs and requirements. In parallel, the 
existing communication mechanism and protocols should be enhanced that allow information 
to flow smoothly and effectively to and between the stakeholders in case of a major event.  
 
There was a call for national coordination and guidance in the UK to address the financial 
sector’s vulnerability to space weather. Since the industry operates globally, international 
coordination is also required to counteract regional space-weather effects.  
6. Conclusions 
Extreme space weather would be a global event that could impact many different critical-
infrastructure sectors with potential long-term service disruptions. In the past, space weather 
has already affected aviation, the power grid, and communication infrastructures on Earth or 
in orbit. It is clear that also the financial sector could be impacted, especially during extreme 
events, in particular through its dependence on GNSS services. As a first step towards 
reducing the risk to financial market infrastructures, awareness needs to be raised among the 
stakeholders. This should then permit members of the sector to assess their vulnerabilities to 
this risk. In order to support this process, the following questions need to be addressed: 
 
• What is the vulnerability of the sector to a loss of GNSS services? 
• What are the consequences of prolonged GNSS service disruption? 
• Are there sufficient redundancies in the system to prevent or limit impacts, or are backup 
systems available? 
• Are existing mitigation measures (both technical or organisational) sufficient under 
extreme space-weather conditions? 
• If not, what new measures should be adopted? 
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• How might the impacts on other sectors, e.g. power and transport, affect operators' wider 
BCP planning? 
 
Addressing these issues would enable an assessment by operators in the sector to evaluate if 
the benefits of implementing mitigation outweigh its costs. 
 
With respect to early warning, financial operators need to specify what prediction capacity 
they need, both in terms of timeliness and warning contents. A further task is to develop an 
understanding in the industry of how to take advantage of early-warning information. 
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ANNEX 1: Agenda 
 
Space Weather and Financial Services 
FINAL PROGRAMME 
Europe House, London 
Friday 27 June 2014 
 
 
09:00 - 09:15 Registration 
 
09:15 - 09.45 Opening – Building resilience to societal risks 
 Stephan Lechner, Director, IPSC,  Joint Research Centre 
Philippa Makepeace, Deputy Director, UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
 
Chair: Elisabeth Krausmann, JRC 
09:45 - 10:15 Space weather, what causes it, and how it is monitored 
  Bill Murtagh, US NOAA 
10:15 – 10:55 The impacts of space weather  
 Space weather effects in an international context 
 Neil Mitchison, JRC 
 Severe space weather: the impact in the UK 
Chris Felton, UK CCS 
Discussion 
 
10:55- 11.15 Coffee break 
 
Chair: Bill Murtagh, NOAA 
11:15 - 12:05 GNSS issues and what they mean for financial systems 
 Why timing matters in financial markets 
Philip Bond, University of Bristol 
 Financial Sector Resilience 
Jagesh Thakkar, UK Financial Conduct Authority 
 Discussion 
 
Chair: Philippa Makepeace, CCS 
12:05 - 12:55 Mitigation for loss of GNSS 
 Provision of forecasts and alerts  
Mark Gibbs, UK Met Office 
 Fibre optic link to UTC time signal 
Leon Lobo, National Physical Laboratory 
 Holdover options for GNSS clocks 
Robert Watson, University of Bath 
Discussion 
 
Chair: Neil Mitchison, JRC 
12:55 – 13:30 Final discussion, round up and next steps 
 
13:30 - 14:30 Networking buffet lunch 
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